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This paper investigates the link between company closures and political preferences using 
German panel data. I first show that job loss due to a company closures leads to similar adverse 
labor market outcomes as those found in other countries. I them show that men become less 
likely to identify with political parties and mainstream parties in particular, while women 
become less interested in politics. Effects are stronger for individuals who see job creation and 
protection as a state responsibility and for lower skilled workers, but do not vary with the 
routine-intensity or offshorability of the former job. 
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Recent years have seen a deterioration of the support for mainstream parties and the rise of 
fringe parties in many Western countries. In the UK, the UK independence party has increased 
its vote share from 0.3% of the national vote in the 1997 general election to 12.6% of the 
national vote in 2015. At the same time, the combined vote share of the two largest mainstream 
parties, Labour and the Conservative Party, decreased from 73.9% of the national vote to 65.1% 
in 2015. In the US, political fringe movements within the mainstream parties, most prominently 
the Tea Party movement in the Republican party, became more prominent, culminating in 
Donald Trump becoming US president on a clear anti-establishment ticket in 2016. In 
Germany, the vote share of the two largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian 
democrats dropped from 76% in 1998 to 61.8% in 2009. At the same time, fringe parties on 
the extreme left (Die Linke and its predecessor parties) and right (NPD, DVU, Republikaner 
and more recently the AfD) have increased their respective vote shares from 5.1% and 3.3% in 
1998 to 8.6% and 6% in 2013. 
Following Donald Trump’s unexpected success in the “Rust Belt” states of the American Mid-
West and the high vote shares for Brexit in former industrial towns in the UK, a particular 
public focus has been on the role that fundamental changes to the labor market, in particular, 
plant closures and the moving of industries abroad, have played for what is often perceived as 
an anti-establishment vote. In this paper, I look at this question using German company 
closures as a source of plausibly exogenous source of job losses and individual-level panel data 
from the German Socio-Economic panel.  
1.2 Job losses, labor market outcomes and recent changes in the labor market 
A large literature has studied the consequences of involuntary job losses on individuals’ 
outcomes such as earnings or health (e.g., Topel, 1990, Ruhm, 1991; Jacobson, Lalonde and 
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Sullivan, 1993; Stevens, 1997; Schoeni and Dardia, 2003; Kodrzycki, 2007; von Wachter and 
Sullivan, 2009; Couch and Placzek, 2010; von Wachter, Song and Manchester, 2011, von 
Wachter and David, 2011; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2015). A typical finding is that 
affected individuals suffer long-lasting and large negative effects in terms of employment 
probabilities, earnings or even mortality. Focusing on individuals who were displaced because 
their employers closed down, I first show that – similar to US evidence –  earnings and 
employment opportunities of affected individuals decline in the years following their 
displacement. Using the same methodology as the more recent papers, I find similar declines, 
in particular in terms of employment: Men who lose their jobs due to a plant closure initially 
have a 31% lower employment probability (34% for women) which partially recovers over 
time. 
I consider how these negative effects are affected by recent changes in labor market 
conditions, namely globalization and technological progress. The automation of work and the 
increased use of computers have contributed to a loss of jobs in which workers mostly engage 
in routine-work, leading to a polarization of labor markets, i.e., the disappearance of middle-
income jobs and increases in the number of workers employed in either “good” or “bad” jobs 
(see, e.g., Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Autor, Katz, Kearney, 2006 and Autor, Dorn and 
Hanson, 2015, for the US; Goos and Manning, 2007, for the UK; Goos, Manning, Salomons, 
2009, 2014, for a range of OECD countries; Spitz-Oener, 2006, and Dustmann, Ludsteck and 
Schoenberg, 2009, for Germany). Recent evidence also suggests that workers, at least in the 
US, faced considerable adjustments costs to increases in international trade, leading to wage 
and employment losses for workers and local labor markets particularly in manufacturing (see, 
e.g., Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song, 2014; Autor, Dorn and 
Hanson, 2015 and Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price, 2016). Both developments 
suggest the disappearance of certain types of work, namely work that is easy to automate or 
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easy to move abroad. In addition to the classical explanations for adverse labor market effects 
of displacement – the loss of firm-specific human capital as well as the depreciation of general 
human capital during unemployment – these developments might increase adverse effects for 
laid-off workers who are skilled in the type of work that is automated or offshored. Recent 
evidence suggests that “task-specific” human capital, i.e., being able to perform certain tasks 
in the workplace, is an important component of workers’ wage growth and that most workers 
move between jobs where they perform similar tasks (Gathmann and Schoenberg, 2010). If 
certain types of work are replaced by either machines or workers abroad, we would expect a 
stronger loss of human capital for those workers who are skilled in these types of work. There 
is also an important gender dimension in these developments as recent evidence suggests that 
men might be suffering more from these changes, in particular the decline in manufacturing 
employment, for example, in terms of marriage prospects (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2017) and 
mortality (Case and Deaton, 2015; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2017). 
I indeed find that employment probabilities post-displacement are substantially lower 
for primarily men who were engaged in more routine-task-intensive occupations prior to job 
loss. Conditional on employment, wages do not appear to change very much. Labor market 
outcomes do not appear to vary with measures of the offshorability of jobs, which is similar to 
recent evidence by Goos, Manning, Salomons (2014) that offshorability does not appear to 
matter much for labor market outcomes once routine-task intensity is controlled for.  
Finally, I consider effects for different education groups. I find that employment losses 
occur for all three skill groups and both men and women, but are much more severe for lower 
skill groups with a similar patterns for wage losses. 
1.3 Job losses, worries and political interest 
Job losses and the experience of unemployment are clearly drastic life-changes for 
many workers. In particular, men’s life satisfaction and mental health appear to be harmed by 
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past and current unemployment (Clark, Georgellis, Sanfey, 2001; Clark, 2003; Clark et al., 
2008, Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009). There is some evidence that this is due to 
concerns about social status (Clark, 2003), which fits with traditional male gender roles as the 
main earner in families. Against this background, I consider how the experience of job loss 
affects individuals’ general political interest as well as their identification with a political party 
in general and with mainstream and fringe parties in particular.  
There are several reasons why one might suspect the existence of such a link. Firstly, a 
large and well-established literature (see, e.g., Nannestad and Paldam, 1994, and Lewis-Beck 
and Stegmaier, 2000, for surveys) has documented a link between economic conditions and 
voting behavior with the general conclusion that bad economic conditions are unfavorable for 
the incumbent party in government. There is also evidence that parental unemployment 
(Siedler, 2011) or job loss fears (Geishecker and Siedler, 2012) lead to more support for far 
right-wing parties in Germany. Secondly, a range of other papers has considered a link between 
individuals’ economic situation and their political preferences in a broader sense, such as 
preferences for redistribution or social policies (e.g., Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2003; Margalit, 2013). In terms of job losses, a crucial element will likely be to 
what extent the individual blames the state rather than, say, an individual employer for their 
displacement. Individuals who strongly believe in free markets and small government for 
example would appear to be inherently less likely to blame the state for individual economic 
misfortune. Another relevant aspect will likely be to what extent displaced workers find their 
worries being reflected by political parties. For example, recent work on Britain (Evans and 
Tilley, 2017) suggests that, in particular, the Labour Party’s movement towards a greater appeal 
for middle-class voters left working class voters without mainstream political representation 
and increased both abstentions from voting and voting for minor/fringe parties such as the UK 
Independence Party.  
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The latter argument might be particularly relevant for workers who suffer more from 
the negative effects of displacement as the type of work they prefer has been displaced by 
machines or offshored to other countries. For offshoring, it appears to be possible that workers 
end up blaming the state and mainstream parties, as factors increasing the risk of offshoring, 
such as free-trade agreements or WTO membership are political decisions. In fact, evidence 
for the US by Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Majlesi (2016) finds that exposure to (Chinese) import 
competition increased political polarization in local labor markets. Dippel, Heblich and Gold 
(2015) consider the effects of Chinese and Eastern European import competition in German 
regions and find evidence that these realized trade shocks contributed to increases with far-
right party identification. For technological change, the case is more difficult as technological 
progress and automation are not clearly linked with any actions by the state or mainstream 
parties. As the evidence of Evans and Tilley (2017) suggests, however, these voters might still 
become disaffiliated from mainstream politics if they perceive the political reaction to their 
problems to be insufficient. Concerns about automation did not play a large role in the German 
political discourse during the sampling period used in this paper, so it seems possible that 
affected workers do not feel being taken seriously by political parties.  
Empirically, I find that involuntary job losses primarily lead to a lower affiliation with 
mainstream parties for men. These effects are economically large. There are no effects on the 
self-stated identification with either right-wing or left-wing fringe parties. I show that the 
effects are much more pronounced for individuals who, before displacement, stated that the 
protection and creation of jobs is a state responsibility. I also consider how people’s worries 
are changed by displacement. The results suggest that again in particular men become more 
worried about their own economic situation and less worried about their job security, while 
more general worries about topics such as the general economic situation, immigration, peace 
or the environment are essentially unchanged. This basic pattern suggests that changes in 
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political attitudes are likely to be related to the experience of the job loss as such. I do not find 
any evidence that changes in political opinions depend on the routine-task intensity or the 
offshorability of the previous job. 
Finally, I find that – at least for men – both the economic effects of displacement and 
the changes in party identification occur for the same skill groups, namely non-university 
educated workers. Political reactions, most prominently the loss in (mainstream) party 
identification are also only found for these two groups, further reinforcing that the political 
reactions are indeed tied to the labor market effects of job loss. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 givens brief overview of 
the political system in Germany and its political parties. Section 3 describes the data and 
estimation strategy. Results follow in section 4, section 5 concludes. 
2 Background information on the political system and parties in Germany 
Germany operates a federal system with major elections being held at the state 
(Landtagswahlen) and the federal level (Bundestagswahlen). In addition, there are elections on 
the local government/county level (Kommunahlwahlen) as well as elections to the European 
Parliament. Most elections are principally based on proportional representation, where the 
proportion of seats a party receives in the respective parliament (Bundes- or Landtag) is a direct 
function of their vote share in the respective election. Parties will need to reach at least 5% of 
valid votes to receive seats in parliament or win seats in three constituencies (Direktmandate). 
Politicians who have been directly elected in a constituency (Wahlkreis) are guaranteed their 
seat regardless of the vote share won by their party. In the case of the Bundestag there are 299 
directly elected members with at least 299 additional members being allocated according to the 
overall vote shares of the parties. The number of non-directly elected members is adjusted (the 
Ueberhangmandate) so that the overall number of seats reflects the vote shares of the 
respective parties. Relative to pure majority voting systems as, for example, used in the UK, 
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the German system provides a higher incentive for people to support smaller parties that are 
more closely aligned with their personal preferences as such votes are not “lost” provided the 
party reaches at least 5% of the vote share overall or can win a constituency. 
There are three mainstream parties that have been around at least since the late 1940s. 
These are the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), the German mainstream center-
left party that can trace its origins to the late 19th century, the Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands (CDU) with its Bavarian sister party the Christlich-Soziale Union in 
Bayern (CSU), both of which are center-right parties founded after the end of World War II 
and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), which is a classical (economically) liberal party 
also founded in the late 1940s. The remaining mainstream party, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, was 
created in 1993 through a merger of the West German Green Party (founded in 1980) and the 
East German Bündnis 90, which was founded during the East German revolution of 1989/90. 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen is a social-liberal party with a strong environmental tradition. Various 
coalitions of these four parties have formed every Federal and most state governments of the 
post-war period.  
The main party on the left fringe of the German party system with any relevant vote 
share is Die Linke, which was formed in 2007 through a merger between the Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS), the successor of the former state party of the German 
Democratic Republic, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, and Arbeit und soziale 
Gerechtigkeit – Die Wahlalternative, which was founded in 2005 as a protest movement 
against labor market reforms enacted by the then ruling coalition between SPD and the Greens.1 
                                                 
1 There are also some other far left parties such as the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei 
(German Communist Party) or the Maxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (Marxist–
Leninist Party of Germany) that do not play a visible role in German politics. For the purpose 
of this paper, supporters of these parties are simply treated as supporting a left-wing fringe 
party (although this is empirically irrelevant as there is not a single supporter of any of these 
parties in the data).  
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Die Linke has been part of various state governments in East Germany, but some parts of it are 
still under surveillance by the German domestic security service, the Verfassungsschutz, as 
they are considered a threat to Germany’s constitutional order.  
The extreme right of the German party spectrum over the time period considered in this 
paper consist of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), founded in 1964, the 
Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), founded in 1971 and merged with the NPD in 2010, and Die 
Republikaner (REP), founded in 1983 as a breakaway from CDU/CSU. NPD and DVU are 
generally considered to be more openly extreme right than the REP, although the latter is also 
known for xenophobic views. All three parties had some limited electoral success in various 
state parliaments in some periods and at least NPD and DVU have been under surveillance by 
the Verfassungschutz at various points in time. After the period considered in this paper, the 
Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) was founded as a less openly extremist and more “normal” 
populist and Eurosceptic party that has enjoyed electoral support in many state elections. 
3. Estimation and data 
The analysis follows a standard empirical approach used, inter alia, by von Wachter, Song and 
Manchester (2011) and von Wachter and David (2012), which has been used as a benchmark 
to test the validity of other approaches by, for example, Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2015). 
The outcome of interest is essentially modelled as 
yit = i + t + 1*displacedt + 2*displacedt-1 + 3*displacedt-2 + 4*displacedt<=t-3 +it  (1) 
where yit is the outcome for individual i at time t, i and t are person and time fixed effects 
and the coefficients of interest are 1 to 4 which give the effects of a displacement due to a 
company closure in the respective year and after 1, 2 and 3 and more years. I also present results 
from joint significance tests for 1 to 4 to make statements about changes in the outcome after 
the displacement. 
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The separate identification of the effects of interest, , and the time effects, , come 
from the inclusion of non-displaced workers, who essentially provide the counterfactual 
outcome for the displaced, and the fact that not every worker is displaced in the same year. The 
central assumption underlying this approach is that – conditional on the fixed effects – workers 
affected by a company closure are like those remaining in employment. This assumption would 
hold if a company closure was a completely random shock. A potential problem, however, is 
that both workers and managers might be aware of the economic problems of a company before 
it actually closes. This knowledge in turn can lead to two effects. Managers might try to get rid 
of the least productive workers in the run-up to the (imminent, but maybe still uncertain) 
closure, while at the same time employees might try to leave the “sinking ship”. Schwerdt 
(2011), for example, finds that in Austria selective turnover of workers begins two quarters 
before the actual closure. In the context of this paper, in which I use annual survey data where 
workers are asked directly about the reason for their displacement, there are two mitigating 
factors for this selection problem. Firstly, the annual frequency of the data makes it more likely 
that workers’ eventual pre-closure turnover is captured in the same year as the actual closure. 
Secondly, given that workers are asked directly for the reason of their displacement2, it seems 
likely that at least some of them would reply with “company closure” even if they resigned in 
the run-up to the closure or were dismissed by management because of the closure. Both factors 
should minimize eventual errors relative to the more commonly used administrative data where 
plant closures are essentially identified by observing mass movements of workers from a 
specific firm at a specific point in time. Notwithstanding these arguments, I also include a one-
                                                 
2 The exact question is “How was this job terminated?” (which is asked as a follow-up question 
to whether the respondent changed jobs). Company closures are identified by the reply 
“Because your place of work or office has closed”. Other alternatives include “My resignation”, 
“Dismissal”, “Mutual agreement” etc. 
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year lead of the displacement event to explicitly allow for differences between displaced and 
non-displaced workers in the year before the plant closure. 
The data used in this paper comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel, a long-
running household panel (see Wagner et al. 2007 for a general overview). Further information 
on the sampling design as well as additional information on the overall structure of the SOEP 
can be found in Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). 
I focus on the period 2001 to 2013 during which all variables of interest are available. 
Following the usual approach in the literature I restrict the sample to workers in stable 
employment in the year before the displacement (in this case with at least three years of tenure) 
and drop very young workers (below 30 years of age) as individual fixed effects might not 
capture the permanent component of their labor market prospects very well (e.g., von Wachter 
and Bender, 2006). Note that individuals who are unaffected by plant closures can also enter 
and exit unemployment over the course of time. I also drop individuals working as legislators 
and senior officials (ISCO 11), as teaching professionals and teaching associate professionals 
(ISCO 23 and 33); as skilled agricultural and fishery workers (ISCO 61) and as agricultural, 
fishery and related laborers (ISCO 92). The former two groups are often lifetime civil servants 
(Beamte) in Germany and cannot lose their jobs, while the latter two groups are essentially 
agricultural workers whose labor markets work very differently from manufacturing and 
service sector employees. Applying these restrictions leaves me with 54,353 observations from 
8,889 men and 43,510 observations from 7,465 women. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics 
for the estimation sample, individual variables are explained in the following paragraphs.  
(Table 1 about here.) 
In a first step, I look at the labor market effects of displacements due to company 
closures on the affected individuals. The logic underlying this first step is quite simple: If 
people’s economic situation does not change because of being affected by a plant closure, it 
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becomes inherently less likely that they will change their political opinion because of it. After 
establishing that individuals are indeed adversely affected, I turn to the main question of this 
paper: To what extent does this experience of having involuntarily lost their jobs shape people’s 
political opinion? I then consider five main outcomes, specifically whether individuals claim 
that they are strongly interested in politics, whether they identify with any political party and 
finally whether they identify with a mainstream, far left or far right party with definitions of 
mainstream, far left and far right following section 2. I also use information from a question 
asked in the 1997 and 2002 surveys (the latter for people not displaced in 2001 or 2002) about 
the role of government, specifically whether individuals state that it is the state’s responsibility 
to create and secure jobs, to consider potential effect heterogeneity along the lines outlined in 
section 1.3. 
Subsequently, I turn to a range of measures that can help to explain why people’s 
political opinions have changed. Respondents in the SOEP are asked annually about a range of 
worries. Some of these, such as worries about their own economic situation or their job, could 
in principle be directly affected by involuntary job loss. Others, such as worries about the 
general economic situation or immigration, could be indirectly affected, if, for example, 
respondents believe that their job was lost due to economic policies pursued by the government 
or because of foreign competition. I also consider a group of worries that are unlikely to be 
affected by the experience of job loss, such as worries about the environment or peace. 
Finally, I consider implications from the recent literature on technological change and 
offshorability. A body of evidence (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Autor, Katz, Kearney, 
2008 and Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2015, for the US; Goos and Manning, 2007, for the UK; 
Goos, Manning, Salomons, 2009, 2014, for a range of OECD countries; Spitz-Oener, 2006, 
and Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schoenberg, 2009, for Germany) has documented that workers 
engaged in routine-task intensive work face potential substitution by technology. In addition, 
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another strand of the literature has documented labor market pressure arising from international 
trade and offshoring (see, e.g., Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Song, 
2014; Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2015 and Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Price, 2016). 
As workers move mainly between jobs with similar task content (Gathmann and Schoenberg, 
2010) this suggests that workers who were engaged in either routine-task intensive or in jobs 
that are more easily offshorable should suffer worse displacement effects and might 
consequently change their political opinions more strongly than other workers. 
To investigate this possibility, I interact the displacement dummies with two measures 
of routine-task intensity and offshorability taken from Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014). 
Both measures are based on the occupation the displaced worker worked in directly before 
displacement. The measure of routine-task intensity is based on one developed by Autor and 
Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015) and mapped into the European occupation 
classification ISCO by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014). Again following Goos, Manning 
and Salomon (2014), the measure of offshorability comes from Blinder and Krueger (2013) 
who collected data on various measures of offshorability as part of the Princeton Data 
Improvement Initiative. The measure used here is Blinder’s and Krueger’s preferred measure, 
which is based on professional coders’ assessments of how easily a given occupation can be 
offshored. The data used again comes from Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) who mapped 
the Blinder/Krueger measure into ISCO codes. Both measures are normalized to have zero 
mean and unit standard deviation. Higher values indicate a higher routine-task 
intensity/offshorability. 
Finally, I estimate equation (1) separately by education levels. I group individuals into 
three groups. The first, the low-skilled, includes people with up to 10.5 years of education. This 
group corresponds to people who either completed the lowest tier of secondary schooling 
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(Hauptschule) and vocational training (giving them 9 + 1.5 years of schooling3) or the middle 
school tier (Realschule, 10 years) without any further education. Medium-skilled are workers 
with between 11 and 15.5 years of education. This group essentially comprises workers who 
completed either the middle or top tier of secondary education (Gymnasium) and some post-
school education, primarily vocational training, below university level. The final group, the 
high-skilled, are formed by everyone with at least 16 years of education, which essentially 
corresponds to university-educated workers. 
4 Results 
Table 2 displays results for labor market. Both men and women experience a sharp drop in 
employment probabilities in the magnitude of 30 percentage points in the year of the 
displacement, which drops to around 4 percentage points three years later. These effects are 
jointly significant. Looking at the one-year lead coefficient, we see slightly higher employment 
prospects for workers affected by displacement, which suggests that these effects are lower 
bounds. This effect is likely to be purely mechanical as everyone affected by a plant closure in 
t will likely have been employed in t-1, while those unaffected might include people who are 
currently not employed. For wages, we see somewhat different results for men and women: 
Women experience an initial drop in wages by roughly 13%, which becomes much smaller and 
insignificant in subsequent years. For men, all post displacement effects point towards a 
statistically significant and large decline in wages. This evidence should be treated with some 
caution, however, as there is evidence for a decline in wages in the year prior to the 
displacement. The larger decline in earnings after 3+ years should be treated with some caution 
– while the point estimate is indeed more negative than in previous years, the difference is not 
actually statistically significant. The general pattern suggests that both men and women appear 
                                                 
3 German vocational typically lasts for three years, but is split up into 50% formal education in 
a vocational school and 50% work experience in a company. By convention, the former is 
included in years of education and the latter in measures of work experience. 
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to suffer in terms of employment prospects with some suggestive evidence that men also face 
a longer-term decline in earnings. The results are somewhat smaller than some estimates for 
the US, but are certainly sizeable enough to lead to an effect on people’s political preferences. 
4 
(Table 2 about here.) 
Table 3 presents evidence on the main question of this paper. Overall the results suggest that 
men lose identification with parties overall as well as mainstream parties in particular. The 
pattern of coefficients is difficult to discuss – the point estimates suggest a decline in t and 
again three years after displacement, but the confidence intervals around all coefficient 
estimates overlap. For women, there does not appear to be any link between displacement and 
political outcomes. There appears to be no increase on fringe party identification in either 
group.  
(Table 3 about here.) 
Table 4 investigates an important source of heterogeneity, namely whether individuals’ beliefs 
about the responsibilities of the state matter. As explained in section 1.3, the underlying idea 
is quite simple: If someone believes that the state has a responsibility to provide and secure 
work for its citizens, it seems more likely that such an individual would blame the state for an 
eventual job loss and subsequently might become disaffected. Someone with strong free market 
beliefs on the other hand is probably less likely to blame the state in such a case. Table 4 
                                                 
4 In addition, I re-estimated table 2 on a matched sample in which those affected and unaffected 
by plant closures. Specifically, I calculate the propensity score to be affected by a plant closure 
in t based on on several characteristics measured in t-1, namely a worker’s years of education, 
lifetime full-time work experience and unemployment experience, occupational position and 
3-digit occupations, and then use radius matching with a caliper of 0.05 to create the matched 
sample. Results are essentially identical to those in table 2. Adding additional controls for 
unemployment and full-time work experience reduces the absolute size of the coefficients 
somewhat but leaves the basic pattern unchanged. 
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suggests that this indeed the case. 5 While we again do not see any effects for women, all the 
effects observed for men in Table 3 appear to be due to people who believe that the state should 
provide and protect jobs. For this group, general and mainstream party identification drop by 
more than 10 percentage points. These results suggest that men who feel that the state needs to 
provide work for them, feel more strongly disaffected 
(Table 4 about here.) 
Table 5 presents evidence on the impact of displacement on various self-stated worries. Overall 
the evidence here is very similar for both men and women: There is an increase in worries 
about job security and the own economic situation in the year before the displacement. Worries 
about the own economic situation remain elevated for a brief period after displacement and 
then return to the baseline. There is also a sharp and persistent drop in the fraction of people, 
in particular men, who are worried about their own job. While the ultimate reasons for this 
effect is unclear, potential explanations would be unemployed individuals not worrying about 
job security, individuals accepting job loss as a fact of life after experiencing it or individuals 
moving into worse jobs making them less concerned about job security as they have less to 
lose. Effect on other worries are generally small and show no consistent pattern that would 
point towards any real effects. In particular, neither men nor women appear to become more 
concerned about the general economic situation or start blaming immigrants. 
(Table 5 about here.) 
(Tables 6 and 7 about here.) 
Tables 6 and 7 replicate Tables 2 and 3, but with interactions for the routine-task intensity and 
the offshorability of the displaced workers’ former jobs. In terms of employment the results 
suggest that male workers who used to work in more routine-task intensive occupations find it 
                                                 
5 Results for the identification for extreme left and right wing parties have been dropped 
henceforth due to space considerations. The effects are essentially the same – namely, zero – 
as those found in the base specifications.  
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harder to find employment after their displacement. This finding is consistent with evidence 
that workers primarily move between jobs with similar task requirements (Gathmann and 
Schoenberg, 2010) and the disappearance of routing-task intensive jobs due to automation. 
Changes to wages as well as labor market outcomes for women appear to be unaffected by the 
routine-task intensity of the previous job. Offshorability also does not appear to matter much, 
which is consistent with findings by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) that offshorability 
does not matter for wage inequality once routine-task intensity is accounted for. In terms of 
political outcomes, Table 7 suggests that political reactions to displacement – except for 
possibly political interest for men and party identification for women – do not vary with the 
characteristics of the previous job. These results suggest that these do not blame the state more 
than other displaced workers. A potential explanation for this result might be that the link 
between fundamental changes in the labor market on the one hand and the closure of a specific 
company and subsequent difficulties in the labor market for affected workers is very indirect 
and might not be obvious to the average worker. 
(Table 8 about here.) 
Table 8 to 10 replicate the results for Tables 2 and 3, but separating worker by their education 
level. Table 8 looks at labor market outcomes. For both men and women, employment losses 
are both more severe and more persistent for lower skilled workers. While high-skilled men 
initially suffer a drop in their employment probability by 23 percentage points, the 
corresponding drop for low-skilled men is almost twice as large at 41 percentage points. Three 
years after the displacement, we still see similar relative differences: Low-skilled men who lost 
their job are now 7 percentage points less likely to be employed, while the corresponding figure 
for high-skilled men is a (statistically insignificant) 3 percentage points. Medium skilled 
workers are between the other two groups. For women, we see essentially the same pattern 
with low-skilled women also suffering more severe and more persistent employment losses 
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than higher-skilled women. In terms of wages, we again only see earnings losses for men. 
These are again much more pronounced for low-skilled workers, who lose between 10 and 
20% of their monthly earnings. Effects are much smaller and usually insignificant for medium 
and high-skilled workers. For women, the pattern of point estimates is similar, the point 
estimates are sometimes economically large, but effects are usually statistically insignificant. 
(Tables 9 and 10 about here.) 
The political reactions for men and women are found in tables 9 and 10 respectively. For men, 
the results suggest that the losses of identification with political parties due to job loss are 
concentrated among the low and medium-skilled with essentially no reaction by high-skilled 
workers. Effects are only jointly significant for low and medium-skilled men and mainstream 
party identification. For women, there appears to be very little reaction in terms of political 
outcomes. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper used plausibly exogenous job losses through company closures to consider the 
relationship between displacement and political attitudes, worries and labor market outcomes 
in Germany. Overall, the results suggest that (a) workers who lose their job because of a 
company closure have a lower probability to be employed and face lower wages, (b) that these 
negative employment effects are worse for men who worked in routine-task intensive 
occupations prior to displacement, (c) that there is some evidence that political attitudes of 
men, but not women, change in response to job loss, specifically that men lose identification 
with parties in general and mainstream parties in particular and (d) that these effects are 
considerably stronger for people who believe that the state has a role to play in the creation and 
preservation of jobs. This result highlights that individuals’ expectations regarding the state’s 
role are an important mediating factor in the relationship between adverse economic shocks 
and political reactions.  
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There is also evidence that the all effects are stronger for low and medium-skilled workers, 
while characteristics of the previous job, such as routine-task intensity of offshorability do not 
appear to matter much for the political reactions. The general pattern of the results, namely that 
effects of displacement on political opinions tend to coincide with negative effects on labor 
market outcomes, suggests that the latter are indeed driving the former. An interesting finding 
is that the loss of support for mainstream parties does not seem to coincide with any increase 
in the support for fringe parties. A possible explanation for this result might lie in some 
specifics of German fringe parties around that time: Die Linke has a history as the former state-
party of the German Democratic Republic, while the three right-wing parties were often 
associated with Neo-Nazi followers – both of which might pose additional hurdles for 
disillusioned mainstream voters looking for a new political home. Indeed, the fact that the AfD 
as a more respectable right-wing, euro-skeptic and populist party could pick up double digit 
vote shares in various federal state elections just a few years after its foundation in 2013 
suggests that there was indeed a previously untapped reservoir of disenfranchised voters that 
could be mobilized by the “right” party. Given this pattern of results, it seems indeed possible 
that the substantial changes to labor markets in Western developed countries in recent history 
have contributed to a decline in mainstream party support in these countries. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 Men Women 




Believes state is responsible for the creation and 
protection of jobs 
.353 .478 .423 .494 
Routine task intensity index -.198 .911 .107 1.07 
Blinder-Krueger offshorability index -.018 .837 -.148 .697 
Strong interest in politics .502 .50 .2741 .446 
Identifies with a political party .507 .50 .412 .492 
Identifies with mainstream party .464 .50 .379 .485 
Worried about own economic situation .185 .388 .204 .403 
Worried about own job security .127 .333 .112 .315 
Worried about general economic situation .362 .481 .369 .483 
Worried about immigration .263 .440 .251 .434 
Worried about the environment .223 .416 .280 .449 
Worried about peace .293 .455 .392 .488 
Worried about crime .348 .476 .402 .490 
Worried about xenophobia .220 .414 .271 .444 
Ln(monthly wage) 8.01 .614 7.29 .810 
Employed .960 .196 .942 .234 





Table 2: Involuntary job loss, employment and earnings 








(1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.043*** 0.059*** -0.039 0.094*** 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.032) (0.012) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.077*** -0.307*** -0.127** -0.340*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.056) (0.027) 
Lost job one year ago -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.056 -0.031 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.043) (0.019) 
Lost job two years ago -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.055 -0.075*** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.051) (0.024) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.131*** -0.044*** -0.036 -0.037* 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.052) (0.020) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.002 0.000 0.178 0.000 
Observations 52025 54353 40868 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 












(1 = yes) 











(1 = yes) 
 Men 
Will lose job in one 
year 
0.016 0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.006 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) 
Lost job due to 
company closure in t 
0.015 -0.055*** -0.067*** 0.009 0.003 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.007) (0.005) 
Lost job one year 
ago 
0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.003 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.009) (0.005) 
Lost job two years 
ago 
0.006 -0.029 -0.032 -0.001 0.008 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.007) (0.009) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
-0.019 -0.047* -0.067*** 0.007 0.006* 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.009) (0.004) 
P-value job loss in 
and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.396 0.040 0.002 0.583 0.388 
Observations 54353 54353 54353 54353 54353 
 Women 
Will lose job in one 
year 
-0.008 -0.006 -0.007 0.006 0.002 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.002) 
Lost job due to 
company closure in t 
-0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.009) (0.002) 
Lost job one year 
ago 
0.001 -0.034 -0.025 -0.008 0.006 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.035) (0.010) (0.005) 
Lost job two years 
ago 
-0.051* -0.012 -0.016 0.004 -0.001 
(0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.011) (0.002) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
-0.039* -0.027 -0.025 -0.005 0.001 
(0.023) (0.030) (0.029) (0.014) (0.002) 
P-value job loss in 
and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.184 0.773 0.812 0.700 0.352 
Observations 43510 43510 43510 43510 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 




Table 4: The role of beliefs in the responsibilities of the state 
 Strong political 
interest 
(1= yes) 
Identifies with a 
political party 
(1 = yes) 




Will lose job in one year 0.034 0.019 0.021 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.031) 
Lost job due to company 
closure in t 
0.052** -0.033 -0.041 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.030) 
Lost job one year ago 0.019 0.043 0.059* 
(0.030) (0.036) (0.036) 
Lost job two years ago 0.029 0.012 0.012 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.035) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.007 0.025 -0.008 
(0.026) (0.036) (0.035) 
Interactions with belief that state is responsible for the creation and protection of jobs 
Will lose job in one year -0.038 -0.034 -0.050 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.043) 
Lost job due to company 
closure in t 
-0.080** -0.048 -0.055 
(0.035) (0.040) (0.040) 
Lost job one year ago -0.023 -0.086* -0.125** 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.053) 
Lost job two years ago -0.050 -0.094* -0.098* 
(0.042) (0.056) (0.055) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.025 -0.160*** -0.129*** 
(0.039) (0.048) (0.047) 
P-value job loss in and after t 
jointly sign. 
0.190 0.001 0.000 
Observations 54353 54353 54353 
 Women 
Will lose job in one year -0.037 0.001 -0.002 
(0.031) (0.035) (0.033) 
Lost job due to company 
closure in t 
-0.017 0.012 0.014 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.033) 
Lost job one year ago -0.021 0.003 0.008 
(0.033) (0.047) (0.047) 
Lost job two years ago -0.060* -0.027 -0.033 
(0.036) (0.044) (0.043) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.075** -0.011 -0.006 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.043) 
Interactions with belief that state is responsible for the creation and protection of jobs 
Will lose job in one year 0.059 -0.014 -0.011 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.045) 
Lost job due to company 
closure in t 
0.033 -0.020 -0.020 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.047) 
Lost job one year ago 0.050 -0.084 -0.075 
(0.052) (0.073) (0.070) 
Lost job two years ago 0.018 0.029 0.034 
(0.052) (0.065) (0.064) 
Lost job three or more years ago 0.074* -0.032 -0.039 
(0.044) (0.058) (0.057) 
P-value job loss in and after t 
jointly sign. 
0.374 0.770 0.804 
Observations 43510 43510 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates include individual and year 
fixed effects.
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Table 5: Involuntary job loss and worries 
 Worried about 
own economic 
situation 








(1 = yes) 
Worried about 
immigration 
(1 = yes) 
Worried about 
the environment 
(1 = yes) 
Worried 
about peace 
(1 = yes) 
Worried 
about crime 
(1 = yes) 
Worried about 
xenophobia 
(1 = yes) 
 Men 
Will lose job in one 
year 
0.093*** 0.203*** 0.053** -0.031 0.029 0.018 -0.027 0.012 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) 
Lost job due to 
company closure in t 
0.073*** -0.100*** -0.007 -0.024 -0.007 0.023 -0.035 -0.016 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) 
Lost job one year 
ago 
0.047* -0.018 -0.008 -0.001 0.038* 0.012 0.026 0.026 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) 
Lost job two years 
ago 
0.008 -0.083*** -0.016 0.028 0.003 0.049* 0.004 -0.021 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
0.006 -0.098*** -0.030 0.011 0.015 0.002 -0.018 -0.014 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.021) 
P-value job loss in 
and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.005 0.000 0.817 0.335 0.449 0.380 0.230 0.443 
Observations 54353 54353 54353 54353 54353 54353 54353 54353 
 Women 
Will lose job in one 
year 
0.029 0.174*** -0.007 0.011 -0.035 -0.024 -0.016 -0.028 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.023) 
Lost job due to 
company closure in t 
0.074*** -0.070*** 0.014 -0.000 -0.039* -0.016 -0.002 0.049** 
(0.026) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024) 
Lost job one year 
ago 
0.018 -0.004 -0.028 0.051 -0.030 0.069** -0.051 0.018 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.037) (0.032) 
Lost job two years 
ago 
-0.002 -0.015 0.038 -0.019 -0.023 0.016 -0.032 0.031 
(0.033) (0.027) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
0.023 -0.031 0.035 0.047* -0.012 0.046 -0.033 0.040 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) 
P-value job loss in 
and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.043 0.026 0.488 0.098 0.426 0.057 0.604 0.351 
Observations 43510 43510 43510 43510 43510 43510 43510 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All estimates include individual and year fixed effects. 
. 
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Table 6: Routine-task intensity and offshorability of prior job and the earnings and 
employment losses of involuntary job loss 








(1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.043*** 0.055*** -0.017 0.083*** 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.035) (0.012) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.076*** -0.315*** -0.119** -0.318*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.053) (0.028) 
Lost job one year ago -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.047 -0.029 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.043) (0.019) 
Lost job two years ago -0.068*** -0.080*** -0.043 -0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.052) (0.025) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.131*** -0.051*** -0.022 -0.031 
 (0.034) (0.016) (0.052) (0.019) 
Interactions with routine task intensity index 
Will lose job in one year -0.005 -0.003 -0.023 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.027) (0.010) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.001 -0.065*** -0.013 -0.058** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.037) (0.026) 
Lost job one year ago -0.001 -0.006 0.016 -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) 
Lost job two years ago 0.012 -0.048** -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.037) (0.022) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.002 -0.027** -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.029) (0.010) 
Interactions with Blinder-Krueger Offshorability index 
Will lose job in one year -0.022 0.005 0.084** -0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.040) (0.015) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.011 0.075*** 0.023 0.039 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.054) (0.037) 
Lost job one year ago 0.000 0.018 0.064 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.040) (0.025) 
Lost job two years ago 0.003 0.018 0.039 -0.032 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.066) (0.040) 
Lost job three or more years ago 0.012 -0.003 0.080* 0.031 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.047) (0.021) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly 
sign. 
0.106 0.000 0.356 0.000 
Observations 52025 54353 40868 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 




Table 7: Routine-task intensity and offshorability of prior job and the effect of involuntary 
job loss on political interest and identification 


























( 1 =yes) 
Will lose job in 
one year 
0.012 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Lost job due to 
company closure 
in t 
0.013 -0.053** -0.065*** -0.018 0.003 0.006 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) 
Lost job one 
year ago 
0.001 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.043 -0.030 
(0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.035) 
Lost job two 
years ago 
-0.001 -0.031 -0.034 -0.052* 0.002 -0.004 
(0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
-0.028 -0.048* -0.068*** -0.040* -0.020 -0.013 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029) 
Interactions with routine task intensity index 
Will lose job in 
one year 
-0.035* -0.021 -0.020 -0.000 0.009 0.000 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Lost job due to 
company closure 
in t 
-0.013 0.018 0.014 0.040** -0.002 -0.005 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
Lost job one 
year ago 
-0.030 0.018 0.010 -0.042* 0.018 0.017 
(0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) 
Lost job two 
years ago 
-0.045** -0.010 -0.016 0.009 -0.020 -0.020 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
-0.040*** -0.012 -0.011 0.015 -0.039* -0.050*** 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
Interactions with Blinder-Krueger Offshorability index 
Will lose job in 
one year 
0.005 -0.033 -0.020 0.018 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
Lost job due to 
company closure 
in t 
0.013 -0.043** -0.017 -0.038* -0.001 0.004 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) 
Lost job one 
year ago 
-0.011 -0.019 -0.011 0.004 -0.044 -0.020 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
Lost job two 
years ago 
-0.007 0.020 0.018 0.010 0.053 0.044 
(0.020) (0.031) (0.030) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) 
Lost job three or 
more years ago 
0.009 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.004 0.028 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.034) (0.027) 
P-value job loss 
in and after t 
jointly sign. 
0.1735 0.164 0.083 0.067 0.491 0.498 
Observations 54353 54353 54353 43510 43510 43510 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 




Table 8: Effects of involuntary job loss by education level 
 Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled 
Men 
Employed (1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year 0.091*** 0.043*** 0.063** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.410*** -0.257*** -0.226*** 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.066) 
Lost job one year ago -0.052 -0.088*** -0.027 
(0.041) (0.027) (0.046) 
Lost job two years ago -0.076** -0.066*** -0.066 
(0.036) (0.026) (0.049) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.074** -0.028 -0.028 
(0.031) (0.021) (0.045) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.000 0.000 0.007 
Observations 15435 28257 10661 
Ln(monthly wage) 
Will lose job in one year -0.047** -0.042* 0.023 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.035) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.110*** -0.059 -0.029 
(0.033) (0.036) (0.046) 
Lost job one year ago -0.133*** -0.031 -0.064 
(0.037) (0.031) (0.087) 
Lost job two years ago -0.100*** -0.054* -0.013 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.074) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.216*** -0.093** -0.017 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.091) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.000 0.303 0.876 
Observations 15435 28257 10661 
Women 
Employed (1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year 0.110*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.028) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.478*** -0.283*** -0.194*** 
(0.047) (0.035) (0.065) 
Lost job one year ago -0.127** -0.014 0.057* 
(0.055) (0.020) (0.030) 
Lost job two years ago -0.117** -0.054* -0.086 
(0.053) (0.028) (0.059) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.066 -0.022 -0.011 
(0.043) (0.023) (0.049) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Observations 11773 25792 5945 
Ln(monthly wage) 
Will lose job in one year -0.130** -0.010 0.039 
 (0.058) (0.041) (0.101) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.203 -0.144** 0.049 
(0.137) (0.069) (0.095) 
Lost job one year ago -0.120 -0.076 0.090 
(0.088) (0.059) (0.082) 
Lost job two years ago -0.128 -0.065 0.089 
(0.113) (0.062) (0.162) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.096 -0.037 0.118 
(0.101) (0.070) (0.103) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.600 0.2195 0.667 
Observations 10874 24380 5614 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates include individual and year 
fixed effects.  
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Table 9: Effect of involuntary job loss on political preferences by skill-level, Men 
 Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled 
Strong political interest ( 1= yes) 
Will lose job in one year 0.011 -0.008 0.146*** 
 (0.035) (0.025) (0.051) 
Lost job due to company closure in t 0.052* -0.014 0.053 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.054) 
Lost job one year ago -0.048 0.033 0.009 
(0.036) (0.029) (0.063) 
Lost job two years ago 0.010 -0.001 0.039 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.051) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.028 -0.027 0.040 
(0.039) (0.026) (0.049) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.146 0.256 0.867 
Identifies with a political party (1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.032 -0.019 0.226*** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.077) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.062** -0.069** 0.033 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.061) 
Lost job one year ago -0.030 -0.000 0.126* 
(0.046) (0.035) (0.069) 
Lost job two years ago -0.058 -0.045 0.124* 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.069) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.091** -0.055 0.139* 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.073) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.103 0.120 0.254 
Identifies with a mainstream party ( 1 =yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.041 -0.020 0.210*** 
 (0.034) (0.027) (0.080) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.098*** -0.062** 0.013 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.064) 
Lost job one year ago -0.053 0.015 0.112* 
(0.050) (0.036) (0.067) 
Lost job two years ago -0.073* -0.041 0.122* 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.072) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.096*** -0.071** 0.071 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.077) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.009 0.034 0.270 
Observations 15435 28257 10661 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 




Table 10: Effect of involuntary job loss on political preferences by skill level, Women 
 Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled 
Strong political interest ( 1= yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.037 -0.013 0.123 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.084) 
Lost job due to company closure in t -0.014 -0.001 0.030 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.065) 
Lost job one year ago 0.000 -0.005 0.018 
(0.041) (0.035) (0.075) 
Lost job two years ago -0.041 -0.074** 0.041 
(0.038) (0.036) (0.090) 
Lost job three or more years ago -0.043 -0.045 -0.046 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.070) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.587 0.194 0.618 
Identifies with a political party (1 = yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.025 0.036 -0.123* 
 (0.038) (0.031) (0.068) 
Lost job due to company closure in t 0.001 0.039 -0.118** 
(0.038) (0.033) (0.056) 
Lost job one year ago 0.041 -0.024 -0.166 
(0.073) (0.043) (0.103) 
Lost job two years ago 0.005 0.017 -0.147 
(0.055) (0.041) (0.098) 
Lost job three or more years ago 0.010 -0.008 -0.159** 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.065) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.988 0.521 0.135 
Identifies with a mainstream party ( 1 =yes) 
Will lose job in one year -0.027 0.035 -0.132* 
 (0.035) (0.031) (0.068) 
Lost job due to company closure in t 0.008 0.029 -0.101 
(0.037) (0.033) (0.062) 
Lost job one year ago 0.054 -0.019 -0.174* 
(0.073) (0.040) (0.101) 
Lost job two years ago 0.013 0.011 -0.198** 
(0.055) (0.041) (0.090) 
Lost job three or more years ago 0.013 -0.006 -0.162** 
(0.046) (0.040) (0.078) 
P-value job loss in and after t jointly sign. 0.966 0.720 0.116 
Observations 15435 28257 10661 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote 
statistical significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates include individual and year 
fixed effects. 
 
 
